Can Governments Affect Tax Incidence? Evidence from a Large VAT Cut in Argentina

Youssef Benzarti UCSB & NBER Santiago Garriga Univ. Nac. de La Plata Dario Tortarolo Nottingham & IFS

Imperial College London

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VAT cuts have gained ground amidst rising inflation

- ▶ VAT has become a common policy tool used to affect the economy
- ► EU Parliament amended the EU VAT Directive in April 2022 → grants EU countries flexibility to Δ VAT rates
- ► The IMF called for govts to avoid temporary VAT cuts on fuels, elect or food as an attempt to ↓ the impact of fast-rising inflation

VAT 'inflation' cuts are on the rise Several countries \downarrow VAT rates on a scale not seen before

E.g., for food:

- 1. Poland: 0% on basic food
- 2. Bulgaria: 0% on basic food
- 3. Lithuania: 0% on food from August
- 4. North Macedonia: 0% on basic foodstuff
- 5. Romania: considers cutting foodstuff VAT to 0%
- 6. Belgium: considers cutting fruit and vegetables VAT to 0%
- 7. Bosnia: cut foodstuff VAT from 17% to 5%
- 8. Croatia: cut foodstuff VAT from 13% to 5%
- 9. Latvia: cut foodstuff VAT from 21% to 5%
- 10. Turkey: cut foodstuff VAT from 8% to 1%
- 11. Greece: cut foodstuff VAT from 24% to 13%
- 12. Others: Spain, Italy, Germany, Ireland, Austria, Slovakia

Governments often state specific goals when cutting VAT rates:

(i) $\downarrow P$ and $\uparrow demand$, (ii) \uparrow cash flow/profits, (iii) \uparrow wages

E.g., EU Parliament:

"overall, the deal struck by the Council (...) maintains the flexibility for Member States to lower VAT on essential products to benefit low-income households and, as such, tackle the regressiveness of the VAT system"

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Implicitly assume that govts can affect tax incidence. Yet little is done to achieve these policy goals

VAT incidence is complicated

Standard model: pass-through of VAT changes to prices

- No role for the government!
- Determined by the relative magnitude of demand/supply elast

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In practice, it's much more complicated:

- Limited vs full pass-through (Benzarti & Carloni, 2019; Kosonen, 2015; Gaarder, 2018; Buettner & Madzharova, 2021; Fuest et al, 2021)
- Asymmetry and price hysteresis (Benzarti et al., 2020)
- Heterogeneity (e.g., large vs small restaurants) (Harju et al., 2018)

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- Heterogeneity (e.g., large vs small restaurants) (Harju et al., 2018)

 \Rightarrow These issues substantially complicate using temporary VAT cuts as a policy tool. Can governments do something about it?

Can governments affect tax incidence? Yes. But... This paper

We empirically show that:

- Tax incidence can be affected by govts in spite of the relative elasticities
- But may miss target population due to unexpected incidence effects

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We empirically show that:

- Tax incidence can be affected by govts in spite of the relative elasticities
- But may miss target population due to unexpected incidence effects

 \Rightarrow We exploit a **large and temporary VAT cut** on basic food in Argentine supermarkets along with a variety of govt "mandates"

 \Rightarrow Goal: contain the impact of a ${\sim}24\%$ currency devaluation on prices following a surprising presidential primary election \bullet Timeline

 \rightarrow Ensuring that the VAT cut was passed on to prices was essential

Reform: a 4.5-month long VAT holiday on basic food



Barcode-level scanner data with P and Q

Treatment

Temporary 0% VAT

Categories

Cooking oils (sunflower, corn, mix) Rice Dried pasta Tea, Yerba Mate, and Mate Cocido Sugar Canned vegetables and beans Canned fruits Corn flour (*polenta*) Wheat flour Fluid milk (whole/skim) Yogurt (whole or skim) Eggs Bread Breadcrumbs and/or batter

Control

Standard 21% VAT

Categories

Other cooking oils (olive, soy, canola) Rice-based meals Breakfast cereal Coffee Salt Herbs, Spices, & Seasonings Dulce de leche (caramel) Jam and Jelly Other flours Crackers, Biscuits, Toasts, Puddings Chocolate Mayonnaise Vinegar Dried legumes and beans

Notes: Wheat flour and bread are taxed at the reduced rate of 10.5%. Source: Decree 567/2019 - Annex (IF-2019 - 73155740-APN-SCI#MPYT).

Data: Grocery Stores

[1] Supermarket scanner data (Scentia)

(1) Large chains (e.g., Walmart), (2) Small independent stores

- Period: Jan'2018 Jun'2021 (182 weeks, 42 months)
- Vars: barcode, description, price, quantity, total sales, 10 regions

E.g., Twinings English Breakfast Tea – 25 Bags

[2] Panel of shoppers & Household Expenditure Survey

To analyze distributional effects (8 income groups) Period: January 2018 – June 2021 - monthly frequency

[3] Price control data (2014-2020)

We built a database with all barcodes and regulated prices from 'Precios Cuidados' and 'Productos Esenciales'

Empirical strategy: Diff-in-Diffs

Run a dynamic DiD comparing T (0% VAT) and C (21% VAT):

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \sum_{t \neq 2019 \text{w}32}^{2020\text{w}10} \beta_t D_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

- Y_{it}: PRICE (weighted average across stores) or QUANTITY (total sold)
- Y_{it}* = 100 (outcomes normalized to 100 for each barcode *i* on 2019w32)
- D_{it}: indicator for whether barcode i is treated in week t
- β_t : estimate the difference btw T and C relative to $t^* = 2019w32$
- ► We use a balanced panel of ≈5,000 barcodes

The VAT abolishment was very salient

August 16, 2019 (1 day post announcement)



Tema del día e Nuevas medidas económica

Eliminan IVA en alimentos. congelan cuotas UVA y habría cambios de Gabinete

Deltator El diálogo y un atisbo de tregua ...



En busca de la mística perdida

Nuevo ataque del hacker que filtró datos de la Federal

Para Alberto F.

el dólar a \$60 está bien v no hay razón para que aumente

Diosdado Cabello: "Que no vaya a creer que lo están eligiendo porque es él



Lavagna suspendió la campaña y pidió que lo imiter

Elecutaron a

en un búnker

de drogas

LA NACION

Macri eliminó el IVA de 14 alimentos y congeló las cuotas de los créditos UVA

Economía. Alcanza a productos de la canasta básica, como leche, par, yerba, harina y arroz regirá hasta diciembre, igual que la suspensión del aurrento de los prestarsos hipotecarios

Value and a modules Langeapitemepender la composia

Dólar: cavó por primera

vez desde

las PASO

Presión militar china a Hong Kong



Filtraron archivos de la Federal sobre Chocobar

Devaluación. Cómo se protegen los clubes

...and so was the VAT increase with \neq caps

January 2, 2020 (2 days after VAT was reintroduced)



A partir de hoy, con la excepción de la leche

Aumentan hasta 10,5% los productos de la canasta básica por la vuelta del IVA

de 9% en aceiter y 10.5% en pan pillado. más Precios Caldados A4

Con mal clima y buen panorama la Costa arrancó sutemporada

Nisman: Alberto dice abora que no hay pruebas para afirmar que fue asesinado

El Personaja CARLON D+25N





de cada año nuevo

LA NACION Jueses 2 de enero de 2020

ASCOLIMPICO Teldo organizará los lacens

Rigen aumentos de entre 7 y 10,5% en la canasta básica v prometen más controles La Casa Rosada no prorrogó el IVA del O% y acordó morigerar el traslado a precios con

INFERNOEN AUSTRALIA

ELMINEO Pigne5

ajantes. Lorge de renationers que donne ros cast niere boss, el codiserto ren cast niere boss, el codiserto II prisernador bonaerenes And Excited, tendrá hor m

Cuatriciclos, con más restricciones



Alarma por Pirotecnia: por segundo año seguido, la escalada de baió el número de heridos en la ciudad tensión entre EE.UU. e Irán



The preserver, etc., etc. 5% allow debetedoperensione preserver and the preserver an

El vaivén con las naftas un símbolo del nuevo gobierno

VELSEA Annon los catallos en

CENTREMIN Pignal

Carlos Pased

Cambio de Fernández sobre el caso Nisman

documental grahade en 2007 dadó de un valcidio aser dijo-que no hay praebas de un asesicano

Soia: el 53% por hectárea quedaría nara el Estado

Ademaia

It was also highly publicized in stores (mandatory banners/tags)



Preview of findings

 \blacktriangleright A large portion of the VAT cut, ${\approx}60\%$, is passed on to lower prices

- Price mandates were successful at ensuring gradual price increases when the VAT cut was repealed
- Pass-through rate of the VAT cut in chain supermarkets is 2x that of small stores where, we show, low-income households are more likely to shop at

 \Rightarrow While the govt was successful at engineering a price decrease using the VAT cut, it partially failed to reach the target population

Outline

- 1. Scanner data: Small & Large grocery stores
- 2. Empirical strategy: Diff-in-Diffs
- 3. Results
 - 3.1. Price responses pooling all stores
 - 3.2. Split up into large vs small stores
 - 3.3. VAT increase with capped pass-through rates
 - 3.4. Quantity responses (inter-temporal substitution)
 - 3.5. (Unintended) distributional effects

Price responses pooling large and small stores

Price *levels* in Large + Small supermarkets



Substantial pass-through of the VAT cut to prices (\sim 60%)



Large vs small stores separately

Average pass-through of the VAT cut is 35% for indep stores and 85% for supermarket chains



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Monitoring App (in large stores only!)



docentes no

debe llegar al 30%

"El número no tiene que empezar con 3", le pidió a la gobernadora Vidal.

esa negociación en las

Lanzan un sistema para vigilar los precios de los supermercados

Y los consumidores nodrán elegir a través de la Web donde comorar. El Gobierno, preocupado





CLAROS Nontre de	producto o merce	a sanita sufficien	۹ 📑	
Mostrar como:	ODA SATUR	Seare 350	25	
Ver productos de	Biocochitos con Grasa Salados Don Satur 200 Gr	Galetitas Valnilla con Releno de Frambuese Sonrisas 118 Gr	Bizcochitos Agriduices 9 de Oro 250 Gr	
> Atriacén O	7795735000328 \$34,99 a \$48,00	7790040931206 \$36,49 a \$60,00	7792200000128 \$26,99 a \$48,00	
Aceitunas y Encurtidos	30 comercios 🕇	30 cornerzios 🕂	30 conversion 🕂	
Aderezos y Especias				
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Desayuno y Merienda				
Frutas Secas	Galletitas Chocolate con Releno de Vainilla Mana 165 Gr	Galetitas con Relieno de Chocolate Tertaciones Mousse	Galetitas Chocolate con Relenc de Limon Meite 120 Gr	
Golosinas y Chocolates	7790040439306	7790040103146	7622300829728	
Harinas y Pastas	\$38,99 & \$56,00	\$38,49 a \$70,00	\$30,60 & \$90,00	
Panificados	30 comercios	30 conversions T	30 conversion	

Robustness and additional results

Very similar results with official CPI data ••

- Pass-through of the Peso depreciation •
- Substitution across products in T and C •
- VAT changes + nominal price freezes •
- Overlap of barcodes across stores •
- Pass-through rates by region •

The role of **caps** in the VAT increase

A VAT increase with capped pass-through

- \bullet VAT rate \uparrow back to pre-holiday level of 21%
- But new govt limited the price increase with \neq caps
- *** No caps**: Prices could \uparrow up to 21%
- * Caps: Force incidence sharing
- We show that govts can successfully limit VAT pass-through

Treated: VAT back to 21%

Categories	$\Delta \mathbf{p}$ cap
Oil (sunflower & mix)	9%
Oil (corn)	No cap
Rice (regular: long grain white)	7%
Rice (other: basmati, brown, organic)	No cap
Dried pasta	7%
Tea, Yerba Mate, and Mate Cocido	7%
Sugar	7%
Canned vegetables and beans	7%
Canned fruits	No cap
Corn flour	7%
Wheat flour	7%
Fluid milk (whole/skim)	0%
Yogurt (regular)	7%
Yogurt (other: w/cereal, fruit chunks)	No cap
Eggs	7%
Sliced Bread (white)	7%
Sliced Bread (rest)	No cap
Breadcrumbs and/or batter	10.5%

Small stores (not subject to caps): No differential effects btw capped and uncapped goods



Large chains: Goods with flexible prices exhibit an increase \sim twice that of capped goods • Recall density



Large chains: Goods with flexible prices exhibit an increase \sim twice that of capped goods • Recall density



The gap is remarkably persistent (hysteresis)



Ultimately leading to a permanent price gap in necessities btw small and large supermarkets



The role of online monitoring

- Small stores: The association that represents them, FASA, didn't participate in the agreement
- Chain supermarkets: The govt announced they would track prices online. An official public servant declared [1] [2]:

"Supermarkets report their prices online to the Ministry of Commerce. The database is updated as soon as they load the price lists, and we can see it. The sector already showed goodwill by working with us until December 31 and committed to absorb two-thirds of the impact. But obviously we'll be monitoring them."
Purchase responses

Quantity effects

Policy goal of the temporary VAT cut was to ensure that households would still be able to purchase necessities

- Income effect: increased purchasing power
- Intertemporal substitution effect: cheaper to consume today

An increase in units sold in supermarkets chains • covid-19



- The policy was successful at sustaining the demand for basic necessities
- But the govt may have overshot it, leading to some hoarding of commodities

Quantity effect is more muted in small stores • COVID-19



- The policy was successful at sustaining the demand for basic necessities
- Muted response in small stores where pass-through was limited

(Unintended) distributional consequences

Policy goal was to ensure that *low-income* households could still afford basic food in a context of inflation



Share of zero-rated goods in total food expenditure, by deciles (%)

- Targeted goods (T) more heavily consumed by the lowest deciles
- But average expenditure on T increases with income

Policy goal was to ensure that *low-income* households could still afford basic food in a context of inflation



- Targeted goods (T) more heavily consumed by the lowest deciles
- But average expenditure on T increases with income

But low-income people tend to shop at small supermarkets where price pass-through was limited (!)



Food expenditure in zero-rated products by type of store (%)

But low-income people tend to shop at small supermarkets where price pass-through was limited (!)



Food expenditure in zero-rated products by type of store (%)

- VAT cut likely benefited richer households more
- Important policy implication when designing VAT cuts

Conclusion: govts can affect tax incidence with political pressure and/or legislative mandates

- A substantial portion of the VAT cut was passed on to prices
 - Likely due to political pressure on supermarkets chains + monitoring
- Govt-imposed caps are effective at mitigating the price increases following the VAT reintroduction
- Pass through rates are more than twice bigger in chain supermarkets (85%) compared to independent stores (35%)
- This turns out to have important distributional effects
 - 1. Poorer households tend to shop more at small supermarkets
 - 2. Further confirmed by the effect on quantities purchased

- Overall, VAT cuts can help ensure continued access to basic necessities during times of high inflation
- Solution But may miss the targeted population due to unexpected incidence effects (the poor tend to shop in stores that pocket the VAT cut)
- Our paper offers lessons/tools for Govts to fine tune VAT cuts and ultimately achieve their policy goals

THANK YOU!

Additional results

Elections, currency devaluation, and VAT cut/hike • Back



Context: high inflation (\sim 55%), elections, currency devaluation

- 1) President Macri defeated in primary presidential elections by a 15.5 p.p. margin (much wider than expected)
- 2) Day after: Argentina's currency collapsed (45 \rightarrow 62 pesos-dollar)
- Govt implements a targeted and temporary VAT cut with due date Dec 31, 2019 [Goal: to contain the impact of currency devaluation on prices]
- New president Fernandez didn't extend the VAT holiday Regulated repeal: limit price increase to 7% (0% for milk, no cap for some)

Price levels in small independent stores • Back



Price levels in supermarket chains (prices are monitored) • Back



Price levels in supermarket chains (weekly data) • Back



Note: *Obs*=2,541,535 (4645 EANs: 2,032 treated + 2,613 control)

Average price pass-through of \sim 85% in large chains \bullet Buck



Note: *Obs*=2,541,535 (4645 EANs: 2,032 treated + 2,613 control)

Distrib of *price changes* two weeks **before** VAT removal Large chains (prices are monitored) • Back





Distrib of price changes right after VAT reinstated

Large chains (prices are monitored)

Com in

Cap section

Back



Distrib of price changes right after VAT removal • Back Large chains (treated goods)



Distrib of price changes: VAT reinstated • Back Large chains



Distrib of price changes after VAT removal

Small stores vs Large chains
• Overlap T & C
• Back



Control goods: Large chains vs Small stores Back



Treated goods: Large chains vs Small stores • Back



Distrib of price changes: VAT removal Back

Small stores vs Large chains



Distrib of price changes: VAT removal Back

Small stores vs Large chains



Pass-through of the 2018 peso depreciation • Back

Exchange Rate (pesos per dollar)



Are goods in **T** and **C** similarly affected by the 2018 peso depreciation? • Back



Do **large** and **small** stores respond *differently* to a large economic shock with no govt mandate? •Back



Pass-through of a 24% currency devaluation (no mandate) is similar in small and large supermarkets



Pass-through of a 24% currency devaluation (no mandate) is similar in small and large supermarkets



Pass-through of currency devaluation: short run (Large chains)



Small stores vs Large chains • Overlap T & C Back Small stores Density Density 0.15 0.20 Treated Treated Small stores Control Control (placebo) 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 -15 -10 10 20 25 -20 -15 -10 10 20 25 30 30 35 APrice (p.p.): Jan'20 vs Dec'19 ΔPrice (p.p.): Feb'20 vs Jan'20 Large chains Density Density 0.15-0.20-Treated Treated Large chains Control Control (placebo) 0.15 0 10 -0.10 0.05 0.05 0.00 -0.00 -15 -10 10 25 30 35 -20 -15 -10 20 25 30 APrice (p.p.): Jan'20 vs Dec'19 ΔPrice (p.p.): Feb'20 vs Jan'20

Distrib of price changes after VAT re-introduction

Distrib of price changes after VAT re-intro • Back Small stores vs Large chains


Distrib of price changes after VAT re-intro • Back

Small stores vs Large chains



Close substitutes in C (e.g., coffee) do not seem to adjust prices after the VAT cut • Back Density Control: close substitutes 0.20 Control: rest 0.15 0.10 0.05 Allia densially 0.00 25 -5 -20-15 -10 5 10 20 -25 15 0 △Price (p.p.): Week 1 vs Week -1

Does substitution across T and C bias our price effects? The results barely change when: • Back

- Including and excluding close substitutes in the control group
- Using food and non-food products in the control group



Does substitution across T and C bias our price effects? The results barely change when: • Back

- Including and excluding close substitutes in the control group
- Using food and non-food products in the control group



DiD of close substitutes in C vs rest of C • Back











Barcodes sold in both small & large stores (overlap) vs sold in either small or large stores (no overlap) • Back



Capped VAT increase: Rice • Back

Regular Rice (7% cap) vs Other Rice (no cap)



Capped VAT increase: Rice • Back

Regular Rice (7% cap) vs Other Rice (no cap)



Capped VAT increase: Canned food • Back

Canned vegetables (7% cap) vs Canned fruit (no cap)



Capped VAT increase: Canned food • Back

Canned vegetables (7% cap) vs Canned fruit (no cap)



Capped VAT increase: Sliced bread • Back Slide bread (white) (7% cap) vs Sliced bread (rest) (no cap)



Capped VAT increase: Sliced bread • Back Slide bread (white) (7% cap) vs Sliced bread (rest) (no cap)



Capped VAT increase: Milk • Back

Milk (0% cap): Full incidence on the supply



Capped VAT increase: Milk • Back

Milk (0% cap): Full incidence on the supply



Regular Yogurt (7% cap) vs **Other Yogurt** (no cap)







Sunflower Oil (9% cap) vs Corn Oil (no cap)



Sunflower Oil (9% cap) vs Corn Oil (no cap)



Pass-through under nominal price controls

VAT changes + price controls • Back

We show that price freezes are more effective at keeping controlling prices than capping the percent increase in prices

Productos Esenciales: 64 barcodes of the Basic Food Basket with price frozen for 6 months (Apr 29–Oct 31, 2019) • Tag • More

► Logic: Price caps limit the incidence of VAT cuts: Stores keep regulated price ⇒ pocket entire VAT reduction

We flag these 64 barcodes in our data and run the DiD

- Treated: 38 EANs (N=34,795)
- Control: 10 EANs (N=11,863); 16 missing (no data)
- (1) Compare Essential barcodes in T vs Rest of goods in T and C
- (2) Compare Essential barcodes in T vs C

Price Controls: mandatory tags, banners, and App



[1] Productos Esenciales (in T) vs Rest (T and C)



[1] Productos Esenciales (in T) vs Rest (T and C)



[2] Productos Esenciales: in T and C • DD



Two complementary policy tools • Back

Monitoring App:

- - Large grocery stores must report daily price data (Art 4: except SMEs)
 - Consumers can search prices/location from web-page or app
 - Administered/enforced by the Consumer Protection Office

Price Controls:

- Precios Cuidados: A list of mass consumption goods with controlled prices (≈500 barcodes, e.g., Coke 1.5L). Since 2014
 - Updated every 4 months; Mandatory tags; Audits; High penalties
- Productos Esenciales: Govt froze the price of 64 barcodes in the Basic Food Basket for 6 months (Apr 29–Oct 31, 2019)
 - High compliance: Daily audits in 2,500 points of sale in the country to detect non-compliance and missing products

[2] Productos Esenciales: Dynamic DiD • Back



[1] Productos Esenciales (in T) vs Rest (T and C)



[1] Productos Esenciales (in T) vs Rest (T and C) • Back



[2] Productos Esenciales: in T and C



[2] Productos Esenciales: Dynamic DiD • Back



Quantity effects in the longer run •Back



Quantity effects in the longer run • Back


Quantity effect (Dynamic DiD): Large chains • Back



Quantity effect (Dynamic DiD): Large chains • Back





Quantity effect (Dynamic DiD): Large chains • Back

Cooking oil vs Control























Heterogeneities by products



Robustness (aggregate price data)

- Result is also present in aggregate price data!
- National Institute of Statistics (INDEC) publishes average monthly prices of some products (link) used in the CPI index (59 products in GBA; 14 products across 6 regions)
- ▶ We break the list into T (0% VAT) and C (21% VAT) and run:

$$\log P_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \sum_{t \neq 2019m7}^{2020m5} \beta_t D_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

 D_{it} is an indicator that denotes whether product i is treated in month tCoefficients β_t test the effect relative to 2019m7

Pass-through to consumer prices [levels]



Partial pass-through [DiD] • Back

