Can VAT Cuts Dampen the Effects of Food Price Inflation?

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NBER Public Economics Program Meeting

October 19, 2023

Food inflation and temporary VAT cuts

Many countries are ↓ VAT rates on food on a scale not seen before to help the vulnerable cope with the soaring cost of living

0% on basic food	Partial VAT cuts	Considering cutting
Peru	Romania (9 to 5%)	Belgium
Poland	Bosnia (17 to 5%)	ltaly
Bulgaria	Croatia (13 to 5%)	Austria
Lithuania	Latvia (21 to 5%)	Slovakia
North Macedonia	Turkey (8 to 1%)	Estonia
Cyprus	Greece (24 to 13%)	Netherlands
Uruguay	DR Congo (16 to 8%)	Belgium
Spain	Costa Rica (13 to 1%)	Germany
Portugal		Angola
Fiji		
Oman		
Togo		

Source: VATCalc www.vatcalc.com

Grocery tax cuts are on the rise in the US too...

Kansas, Alabama, Virginia, Illinois, Tennessee

Kansas phases out sales tax cut on food (6.5% to 0%)



- ► These initiatives are at odds with IMF/OECD advice against using VAT cuts in response to rising inflation
- ▶ But no (relevant) evidence → inflation is rare since late 1980s
- ► And little is done to achieve (expensive!) policy goals

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Can VAT Cuts Dampen the Effects of Food Price Inflation?


We study whether temporarily reducing VAT rates on foodstuff can mitigate the effects of inflation using **Argentina** as our laboratory


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We study whether temporarily reducing VAT rates on foodstuff can mitigate the effects of inflation using **Argentina** as our laboratory


- Do supermarkets lower (VAT-inclusive) prices or pocket some of it?
- Can gov'ts mandate tax incidence? (e.g., anti-profiteering clauses)
- What are the distributional effects?






• **VAT cut**: unanticipated, large, salient, and temporary

 \rightarrow Govt urged *full* pass-through to P (0.21/1.21=17.4%) [link]



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- VAT increase: back to 21%
- \rightarrow Govt imposed caps on how much P could increase (0%, 7%, or no cap)



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- VAT increase: back to 21%
- → Govt imposed caps on how much P could increase (0%, 7%, or no cap)

- Price monitoring system:
- → In chain supermarkets only! [link]

Data (Scentia scanner data) & Strategy (DiD)

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \sum_{t \neq 2019m7} \beta_t D_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$
 $i: barcodes$ $t: months-years$

Treatment (0% VAT)

Categories 4 4k barcodes Cooking oils (sunflower, corn, mix) Rice Dried pasta Tea, Yerba Mate, and Mate Cocido Sugar Canned vegetables and beans Canned fruits Corn flour (polenta) Wheat flour Fluid milk (whole/skim) Yogurt (whole or skim) Eggs Bread

Breadcrumbs and/or batter


Control (21% VAT)

Categories	3.7k barce	odes
Other cooking o	ils (olive, s	oy, canola)
Rice-based meal	S	
Breakfast cereal		
Coffee		
Salt		
Herbs, Spices, & Seasonings		
Dulce de leche (caramel)		
Jam and Jelly		
Other flours		
Crackers, Biscui	ts, Toasts,	Puddings
Chocolate		
Mayonnaise		
Vinegar		
Dried legumes a	nd beans	


Data provider: Scentia LLC. Barcode-level scanner data from supermarkets with P and Q.

Price responses pooling chains and indep stores

Price *levels* in Chains + Independent supermarkets



Substantial pass-through of the VAT cut to prices (\sim 60%)











Chain vs Independent stores



Average pass-through of the VAT cut is 35% for indep stores and 85% for supermarket chains




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
Mitigating subsequent price increases using pass-through caps

VAT rate reinstated at 21% but pass-through was **capped** in chain supermarkets at \sim 7% for some goods



- ▶ Goods w/flexible prices exhibit an increase \sim 2x that of capped goods
- ightharpoonup The gap is remarkably persistent ightharpoonup hysteresis

Ultimately led to a permanent price gap in necessities btw independent and chain supermarkets



(Unintended) distributional


consequences

Policy goal was to ensure that *low-income* households could still afford basic food in a context of inflation



Targeted goods (T) more heavily consumed by the lowest deciles

But low-income people tend to shop at indep supermarkets where price pass-through was limited (!)




Important policy implication when designing VAT cuts

Welfare implications

VAT cut benefits the poor (albeit w/leakages)


• CES model provides simple expression based on observable expenditure shares and price changes: $d \ln V_h = -\sum_g \alpha_{gh} \cdot d \ln p_{gh}$



Welfare implications

VAT increase hurts the poor

• CES model provides simple expression based on observable expenditure shares and price changes: $d \ln V_h = -\sum_g \alpha_{gh} \cdot d \ln p_{gh}$



Possible mechanisms

Chains vs independent stores

- ► Enforcement (price monitoring in chains) •
- Evasion (independent stores)

[Bachas et al, 2020; Kopczuk et al, 2016]

▶ Pricing strategies (rigidities and menu costs)
▶ [DellaVigna & Gentzkow, 2019; Harju et al, 2018]

Competition

[Genakos & Pagliero, 2022]

Robustness and additional results

- Very similar results with official CPI data
- Substitution across products in T and C
- ▶ VAT changes + nominal price freezes •
- Pass-through rates by region
- Store-switching behavior
- ▶ Purchase responses (Q) •

Concluding remarks

- While VAT cuts + gov't 'mandates' can be effective tools to
 - lower prices in grocery stores,
 - d ensure continued access to basic food during high inflation,
 - mitigate subsequent price increases

They can lead to

- abla asymmetric responses across chain and indep supermarkets,
- hysteresis effects in the medium-run,
- unintended distributional/incidence effects
- \Rightarrow In all, the Arg experience helps us advance knowledge on: (i) how tax incidence might operate in supermarkets, (ii) policy design.

THANK YOU!

Dario Tortarolo dtortarolo@worldbank.org

Additional results

Contribution [REMOVE SLIDE?]


1. VAT as a tool to affect economic variables:

- ★ Blundell (2009); Crossley et al (2009); Bachmann et al (2021); Slemrod (2011); Benzarti & Tazhitdinova (2011); Pomeranz (2015); Naritomi (2019); D'Acunto et al (2022)
- ightarrow While VAT can be effective at lowering prices, the distributional effects can be unintended, in part because we don't yet fully understand tax incidence

2. Economic incidence of consumption taxes and empirical anomalies:

- ★ Fullerton & Metcalf (2002); Benzarti et al (2020); Benzarti & Carloni (2019); Kosonen (2015); Kopczuk et al (2016); Benedek et al (2019); Carbonnier (2007); Fuest et al (2021); Buettner & Madzharova (2020); Harju et al (2018); Gaarder (2018); Bachas et al (2020); Genakos & Pagliero (2022)
- \rightarrow Govts can influence how much of a statutory tax change is passed on to consumers prices beyond relative magnitudes of S and D elasticities
- \rightarrow Pass-through can vary widely by type of supermarket consumers shop at

Elections, currency devaluation, and VAT cut/hike • Back



Context: high inflation ($\sim 55\%$), elections, peso devaluation

- 1) President Macri defeated in primary presidential elections by a 15.5 p.p. margin—much wider than expected
- 2) Day after: Argentina's currency collapsed (45 ightarrow 62 pesos-dollar)
- 3) Govt implements a temporary VAT holiday on basic food set to expire on Dec 31, 2019 [Goal: to contain the impact of devaluation on prices]
- 4) New president Fernandez didn't extend the VAT holiday Regulated repeal: limit price increase to 7% (0% for milk, no cap for some)

At the core of the debate... • Back



"It's unreasonable to reduce the VAT indiscriminately as has been done. This will not result in a decrease in prices. It will surely be pocketed by companies. It would have been better to rebate the VAT to the most neglected sectors."

Normative debate: VAT cuts or targeted tax rebates



- Commonly argued that policy should target the most needy
- * E.g., VAT rebates through debit cards

• Tarjeta Alimentar

- ⋆ Debit card to purchase basic food
- * For AUH recipients with children up to 14yo
- \star 2.5m cardholders (95% are women) covering about 4m children
- A tool with potential for targeted VAT rebates [Press]
- ★ But subject to pitfalls when poorly designed (e.g., see Cruces et al, 2020)

Enforcement tools at hand Back






Media article (August 16, 2019)



Cuál será el efecto de la reducción del IVA en los alimentos hásicos: habrá controles y sanciones del Gobierno

El director nacional de Defensa del Consumidor, Fernando Blanco Muiño, precisó qué tipo de herramientas se emplearán para que los precios no sigan en alza

'Precios Claros' webpage



Article translates to: "What will be the effect of the VAT cut on basic food: there will controls and sanctions from the govt"

VAT cut enforced by the Consumer Protection Agency:

- 1) Precios Claros: Online price monitoring system since Feb'16 \rightarrow in chains only!
- 2) Ley de Lealtad Comercial: Fair Retail Law passed in Apr'19

Enforcement tools at hand Mechanisms

The Head of the Consumer Protection Agency stated: [link]

- "Daily, between 6 and 8am, all supermarket chains in the country submit their prices through the <u>App 'Precios Claros'</u>. This provides us with updated info that can be compared with historical data."
- "We will control stores to ensure that the tax cut is passed on to lower prices and not higher profits."
- ► "The Consumer Protection Agency will act through the regime of fines supported by the Fair Retail Trade Law."

VAT cut/increase was highly publicized in the media & (chain) supermarkets (mandatory banners/tags) • Mechs

Viernes 16.8.2019



ClarinX





Repeal, pass-through caps, and online monitoring

► Chain supermarkets: govt said they would track prices daily: [link]


"Supermarkets report their prices online to the Ministry of Commerce. The database is updated as soon as they upload the price lists, and we can see it. The sector already showed goodwill by working with us until December 31 and committed to absorb two-thirds of the impact. But obviously we'll be monitoring them"


► Small stores: FASA association not part of the agreement [link]

<u>Translation</u>: "The government assures that it will control 'online' that the new food price agreement is fulfilled" [Jan 1st, 2020]





Collusion? Unlikely • Back






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


Price levels in small independent stores • Back




Price levels in **supermarket chains** (prices are monitored)







Control goods: Large chains vs Small stores Back



Treated goods: Large chains vs Small stores Back




Price levels in supermarket chains (weekly data) • Back



Note: Obs=2,541,535 (4645 EANs: 2,032 treated + 2,613 control)


Average price pass-through of \sim 85% in large chains \bullet 85%






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Indep stores cheaper (pre-reform) than chain supermarkets




$$\begin{array}{l} \log P_{\textit{irst}} = \alpha_{\textit{irt}} + \sum_{t \neq 2019m7}^{2020m3} \beta_t \\ \textit{IndepStore}_{\textit{irt}} + \epsilon_{\textit{irst}} & \bullet \\ \textit{Back} \\ \textit{i:barcodes}, \textit{r:5} & \text{regions}, \textit{t:month-year}, \textit{s:store type} \end{array}$$

Indep stores cheaper (pre-reform) than chain supermarkets




$$\log P_{irst} = lpha_{irt} + \sum_{t
eq 2019m7}^{2020m3} eta_t ext{IndepStore}_{irt} + \epsilon_{irst}$$
 • Back $i: barcodes, r: 5 ext{ regions}, t: month-year, s: store type$

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
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But largely heterogeneous across the 5 regions • Back




$$\begin{array}{l} \log P_{\textit{irst}} = \alpha_{\textit{irt}} + \sum_{t \neq 2019m7}^{2020m3} \beta_t \text{SmallStore}_{\textit{irt}} + \epsilon_{\textit{irst}} \\ \textit{i: barcodes}, \textit{r: 5 regions}, \textit{t: month-year}, \textit{s: store type} \end{array}$$

But largely heterogeneous across the 5 regions • Back



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
But largely heterogeneous across the 5 regions •Back



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
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
But largely heterogeneous across the 5 regions •Back




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
Price density for overlapped and non-overlapped barcodes • Back






Price density for overlapped barcodes • Back

Var: $P_{ir,t0}^{\text{Small}}/P_{ir,t0}^{\text{Large}} * 100$




Distrib of price changes two weeks before VAT removal

Large chains (prices are monitored) • Back




Distrib of price changes right after VAT removal

Large chains (prices are monitored) ▶ Zoom in ▶ Substitutes ▶ Back




Distrib of price changes right after VAT reinstated

Large chains (prices are monitored) ▶ Zoom in ▶ Cap section ▶ Back




Distrib of price changes right after VAT removal •Back

Large chains (treated goods)




Distrib of price changes: VAT reinstated • Back


Large chains





Distrib of price changes after VAT removal

Small stores vs Large chains Overlap T & C Back











Distrib of price changes: VAT removal Pack

Small stores vs Large chains




Distrib of price changes: VAT removal Pack

Small stores vs Large chains




Pass-through of the 2018 peso depreciation • Back

Exchange Rate (pesos per dollar)




Source: BCRA, Tipo de Cambio de Referencia - Comunicación "A" 3500 (Mayorista).


Are goods in **T** and **C** similarly affected by the 2018 peso depreciation? •Back




Do **large** and **small** stores respond *differently* to a large economic shock with no govt mandate? •Back




Pass-through of a 24% currency devaluation (no mandate) is similar in small and large supermarkets



Pass-through of a 24% currency devaluation (no mandate) is similar in small and large supermarkets




Pass-through of currency devaluation: short run (Large chains)




Distrib of price changes after VAT re-introduction

Small stores vs Large chains → Overlap T & C → Back




Distrib of price changes after VAT re-intro Back

Small stores vs Large chains




Distrib of price changes after VAT re-intro • Back

Small stores vs Large chains




Close substitutes in C (e.g., coffee) do not seem to adjust prices after the VAT cut •Back




Does substitution across T and C bias our price effects? The results barely change when: •Back

- Including and excluding close substitutes in the control group
- Using food and non-food products in the control group





Does substitution across T and C bias our price effects? The results barely change when: •Back


- Including and excluding close substitutes in the control group
- Using food and non-food products in the control group





DiD of close substitutes in C vs rest of C Back












Barcodes sold in either indep or chain stores (no overlap) vs sold in both types of stores (overlap) •Back



▶ Pass-through is greater for varieties sold in both types of stores

VAT rate reinstated at 21% but pass-through was capped


- \bullet VAT rate \uparrow back to pre-holiday level of 21%
- ullet But new govt limited the price increase with \neq caps
- \bigstar No caps: Prices could \uparrow up to 21%
- Caps: Force incidence sharing
 NOT in independent stores
- ⇒ We show that gov'ts can successfully limit VAT pass-through → Back

Treated: VAT back to 21%

Categories	$\Delta \mathbf{p}$ cap
Oil (sunflower & mix)	9%
Oil (corn)	No cap
Rice (regular: long grain white)	7%
Rice (other: basmati, brown, organic)	No cap
Dried pasta	7%
Tea, Yerba Mate, and Mate Cocido	7%
Sugar	7%
Canned vegetables and beans	7%
Canned fruits	No cap
Corn flour	7%
Wheat flour	7%
Fluid milk (whole/skim)	0%
Yogurt (regular)	7%
Yogurt (other: w/cereal, fruit chunks)	No cap
Eggs	7%
Sliced Bread (white)	7%
Sliced Bread (rest)	No cap
Breadcrumbs and/or batter	10.5%


Capped VAT increase: Rice • Back

Regular Rice (7% cap) vs Other Rice (no cap)




Capped VAT increase: Rice • Back

Regular Rice (7% cap) vs Other Rice (no cap)




Capped VAT increase: Canned food • Back

Canned vegetables (7% cap) vs Canned fruit (no cap)




Capped VAT increase: Canned food • Back

Canned vegetables (7% cap) vs Canned fruit (no cap)




Capped VAT increase: Sliced bread • Back

Slide bread (white) (7% cap) vs Sliced bread (rest) (no cap)




Capped VAT increase: Sliced bread • Back

Slide bread (white) (7% cap) vs Sliced bread (rest) (no cap)




Capped VAT increase: Milk • Back

Milk (0% cap): Full incidence on the supply




Capped VAT increase: Milk • Back


Milk (0% cap): Full incidence on the supply




Regular Yogurt (7% cap) vs Other Yogurt (no cap)




Regular Yogurt (7% cap) vs Other Yogurt (no cap)



Sunflower Oil (9% cap) vs Corn Oil (no cap)




Sunflower Oil (9% cap) vs Corn Oil (no cap)



Small stores (not subject to caps): No differential effects btw capped and uncapped goods •Back

7% cap vs No cap



Pass-through under nominal price controls

VAT changes + price controls ▶ Back

We show that price freezes are more effective at keeping controlling prices than capping the percent increase in prices

Productos Esenciales: 64 barcodes of the Basic Food Basket with price frozen for 6 months (Apr 29–Oct 31, 2019) • Tag • More

▶ Logic: Price caps limit the incidence of VAT cuts: Stores keep regulated price ⇒ pocket entire VAT reduction

We flag these 64 barcodes in our data and run the DiD

- Treated: 38 EANs (N=34,795)
- Control: 10 EANs (N=11,863); 16 missing (no data)
- (1) Compare Essential barcodes in T vs Rest of goods in T and C
- (2) Compare Essential barcodes in T vs C

Price Controls: mandatory tags, banners, and App












[1] Productos Esenciales (in T) vs Rest (T and C)



[1] Productos Esenciales (in T) vs Rest (T and C)



[2] Productos Esenciales: in T and C • DID



Two complementary policy tools • Back


Monitoring App:

- Precios Claros: an Electronic Price Advertising System (SEPA) launched in 2016. Goal: ↑ price visibility
 - Large grocery stores must report daily price data (Art 4: except SMEs)
 - Consumers can search prices/location from web-page or app
 - Administered/enforced by the Consumer Protection Office


Price Controls:

- ▶ Precios Cuidados: A list of mass consumption goods with controlled prices (≈500 barcodes, e.g., Coke 1.5L). Since 2014
 - Updated every 4 months; Mandatory tags; Audits; High penalties
- ▶ **Productos Esenciales**: Govt froze the price of 64 barcodes in the Basic Food Basket for 6 months (Apr 29–Oct 31, 2019)
 - ► High compliance: Daily audits in 2,500 points of sale in the country to detect non-compliance and missing products


[2] Productos Esenciales: Dynamic DiD • Back




[1] Productos Esenciales (in T) vs Rest (T and C)




[1] Productos Esenciales (in T) vs Rest (T and C) • Back




[2] Productos Esenciales: in T and C




[2] Productos Esenciales: Dynamic DiD • Back




Quantity effects in the longer run PBGK



Quantity effects in the longer run • Back




Quantity effect (Dynamic DiD): Large chains • Back





Quantity effect (Dynamic DiD): Large chains Pack


Canned fruit/veg vs Control




Quantity effect (Dynamic DiD): Large chains • Back












































Low-income people do not seem to switch to chain supermarkets • Back



Low-income people do not seem to switch to chain supermarkets • Back



Heterogeneities by products




Robustness (aggregate price data)

- Result is also present in aggregate price data!
- National Institute of Statistics (INDEC) publishes average monthly prices of some products (link) used in the CPI index (59 products in GBA; 14 products across 6 regions)
- ▶ We break the list into T (0% VAT) and C (21% VAT) and run:


$$\log P_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \sum_{t \neq 2019m7}^{2020m5} \beta_t D_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

 D_{it} is an indicator that denotes whether product i is treated in month t Coefficients β_t test the effect relative to 2019m7

Pass-through to consumer prices [levels]



Partial pass-through [DiD] • Back • Robustness



$$\log P_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \sum_{t \neq 2019m7}^{2020m5} \beta_t D_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$


Purchase responses

Quantity effects

Policy goal of the temporary VAT cut was to ensure that households would still be able to purchase necessities


- ► Income effect: increased purchasing power
- ▶ Intertemporal substitution effect: cheaper to consume today

Units sold increased in supermarkets chains •coviD-19



- The policy was successful at sustaining the demand for basic necessities
- But the govt may have overshot it, leading to some hoarding of commodities

Q effect is more muted in independent stores • RODUSTNESS



- The policy was successful at sustaining the demand for basic necessities
- Muted response in small stores where pass-through was limited